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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FINLEY BRIGGS, STRATFORD I 
WENDELBOE,R.G.APGOOD, .1 
R 0 D N E Y BUTTERWORTH, 
RUSSELL LARSEN, JOE OLI-
YER, WILLIAM JAMES, and 
ORSON D. SPENCER, \Case No. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants~ 9898 
vs. 
LINCOLN HANKS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
COME NOW Finley Briggs, Stratford Wendel-
boe, R. G. Apgood, Rodney Butterworth, Russell 
Larsen, Joe Oliver, William James, and Orson D. 
Spencer, Plaintiffs and Appellants herein, and respect-
fully petition this Honorable Court for a rehearing 
on the above-entitled case. 
This petition is based on the following grounds: 
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POINT I 
THE COLORADO CASE OF KNOFF Y. 
GRACE, DECIDED JULY 7, 1920, DOES NOT 
CONTROL IN THIS CASE IN LIGHT OF 
WOODHAUS V. ACKERMAN, ET AL, DE-
CIDED JULY 13, 1964, BY THE SUPREl\IE 
COURT OF COLORADO, WHEREIN IT WAS 
STATED WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE 
SUFFICIENT PART PERFORMANCE TO 
TAKE AN ORAL AGREEMENT FROM 
WITHOUT THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT HAS MISINTERPRETED 
THE RECORD PERTAINING TO PAYMENT 
BY TWO PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR RE· 
SPECTIVE SHARES OF STOCK FROM DE· 
FENDANT HANKS, IN THAT THE T"\VO 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT SEND CHECKS TO 
HANKS; BUT IN FACT DID DELIVER 
THEIR CHECKS TO HANKS PERSONALLY, 
WHO ACCEPTED THEM AT THE TIME AS 
PAYMENT IN FULL, WHICH CONCLU-
SIVELY DEMONSTRATES THE EXIST-
ENCE OF AN ORAL AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE PARTIES FOR STOCK. 
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llRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE COLORADO CASE OF 1\::NOFF V. 
GRACE, DECIDED JULY 7, 1920, DOES NOT 
CONTROL IN THIS CASE IN LIGHT OF 
WOODHAUS Y. ACKERMAN, ET AL, DE-
CIDED JUL-Y 13, 1964, BY THE SUPREME 
COURT OF COLORADO, WHEREIN IT WAS 
STATED WHAT 'VOULD CONSTITUTE 
SUFFICIENT PART PERFORMANCE TO 
TAI\:E AN ORAL AGREEMENT F R 0 M 
\VITHOUT THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The language in the Grace case, which appears at 
first glance to control, is as follows: 
"It is also the rule that what is done as part 
perfonnance must, to escape the statute, be con-
sistent with no theory other than that of the 
alleged oral lease. What is fairly referable to 
some other cause than the contract as alleged will 
not be regarded as sufficient part performance 
to justify a decree of specific performance." 
This language has never been repeated by any 
subsequent Colorado decision and stands alone in the 
Grace case. The Colorado Supreme Court has con-
sidered three recent cases involving the Statute of 
Frauds, and in any one of them could have cited the 
Grace case or referred to the above-quoted portion and 
rendered a decision opposite to that which it did. 
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The most recent case is W oodhaus v. AckermanJ 
et alJ ____ Colo. ____ , 394 P .2d 121, which involved two 
ranchers who, in 1949, under an oral agreement, ex-
changed the use of land for their mutual convenience, 
each fencing a portion of the other's land to be used 
in connection with his adjacent land. There were no 
deeds exchanged, abstracts prepared, surveys per-
formed, but each used the other's property as orally 
agreed for some twelve years. The question arose 
whether or not the exchange contemplated by the 
ranchers was one of right of use or an actual convey-
ance one to the other of the land involved. The court 
stated: 
"The law is well settled that equity will, under 
certain circumstances, order specific perform-
ance of oral agreements for the sale or exchange 
of lands and titles thereto ... " 
In Von Trotha v. Bamberger_, 15 Colo. 1, 24 P. 
883, we find the following language: 
" ***Acts of part performance, such as will 
furnish a foundation for enforcing a verbal con-
tract respecting land otherwise void under the 
statute of frauds, must be such as are done in 
pursuance, or according to the terms of the con-
tract, and which in some manner affect or change 
the relation of the parties in respect to the prop-
erty whereby one of the parties would be de-
frauded if the contract were not enforced. 1 
Story, Eq. Jr. pp. 758-766; 3 Porn. Eq. J ur. pp. 
1409; Gill v. Newell, 13 Minn, 462 (Gil. 430). 
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The trial court held there was an oral agreement 
to exchange lands and ordered specific performance for 
the exchange of lands involved. The Colorado Supreme 
Court in reversing the lower court did so on the record 
of the trial court and cited a rule it had announced 
some 74 years prior in the Van Trotha v. Bamberger 
case with no mention of the Grace case. 
The Grace case could not be cited in W oodhaus 
v. Ackerman, for the Colorado Supreme Court had 
clearly departed from the Grace case in two very recent 
decisions, Rupp v. Hill, 367 P.2d 746, and Coulter v. 
Anderson, 357 P .2d 76. 
Rupp v. Hill involved an action by a tenant in 
common to partition land and equipment. The defend-
ant cotenant, who was in possession, sought enforce-
ment of an alleged oral agreement by the plaintiff co-
tenant to sell his shares for the amount of his invest-
ment, plus 10 per cent interest. The trial court entered 
a decree directing the property to be sold en bloc. The 
Supreme Court of Colorado held this to be error and 
remanded the case for the trial court to determine 
whether possession by the defendant cotenant was 
referrable to the alleged oral contract to sell and 
whether the defendant cotenant had made part per-
formance so as to take the contract out of the statute 
of frauds. The Colorado Court stated: 
"If there was a parol agreement, does posses-
sion of the property by Rupp and his family 
make inapplicable the statute of frauds? It de-
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pends on whether such possessiOn is referable 
to the agreement. 
"Actual possession in furtherance o{ an oral 
contract may be made the foundation for a de-
cree of a specific performance, but such posses-
sion must be referable to the contract. Von 
Trotha v. Bamberger; 3 American Law and 
Property 31, Sec. 11.8. 
"Whether possession is referrable to the con-
tract rests upon circumstances and should be 
resolved by the trier of the facts. See Bushner v. 
Bushner, 134 Colo. 509, 307 P.2d 204." 
Not one single act of part performance which the 
defendant cotenant could prove would be consistent 
with no theory other than alleged oral contract to sell. 
1. He was in possession of the property, but he 
would likewise be in possession as a cotenant. 
2. He made 1ninor repairs and improvements, but 
he would likewise make minor improvements and repairs 
as a cotenant. 
3. He obtained a release from a defaulting pur-
chaser, but he likewise would obtain such a release to 
clear his title as a cotenant. 
The court concluded that the above acts may 
show part performance by the defendant cotenant re-
ferable to the alleged oral contract requiring the trier 
of the fact to determine whether the acts of part per-
formance relied upon are referable to the oral contract 
which would take oral agreement from without the 
statute of frauds. 
L 
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In Coulter v. Anderson, Colo., 357 P.2d 76, de-
cided November 14, 1960, the purchasers of a dude 
ranch brought an action for specific performance of an 
alleged agreement to purchase. Purchasers relied upon 
a document which purported to be an agreement to sell 
and convey property, under which they went into pos-
session, and which was executed by all of the parties 
but from which numerous details were omitted. 
The facts of this case are somewhat analagous to 
the situation at hand, where Hanks prepared a contract 
with appellants but omitted reference to the stock 1n 
question and other matters. 
The Colorado Supreme Court stated: 
"In view of our conclusion that there was a 
binding contract notwithstanding that some pro-
visions were oral and others were in writing, and 
consistent with our conclusion that the parties 
did not intend to postpone a legal meeting of the 
minds until some future occasion, we must de-
termine that the statute of frauds, C.R.S. '53, 
59-1-8, is not applicable." 
Now here is the Colorado rule concerning part per-
formance of parol agreement to remove that agree1nent 
from the statute of frauds is as stated by appellee. In 
fact, the language quoted from the Grace case has never 
been reiterated in any subsequent Colorado case. All 
the Grace case stands for is that possession and the 
payment of rent pursuant to an oral agreement to rent 
for a period longer than one year is not sufficient, 
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standing alone, to take that particular situation from 
without the statute of frauds. 
It is respectfully submitted that all that is re-
quired by the law of Colorado to remove an oral agree-
ment from within the statute of frauds is that the part 
performance relied upon be referable to the alleged 
oral agreement. Whether the acts relied upon are suf-
ficient is to be determined by the trier of the facts. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT HAS MISINTERPRETED 
THE RECORD PERTAINING TO PAYMENT 
BY TWO PLAINTIFFS FOR THEIR RE-
SPECTIVE SHARES OF STOCK FROM DE· 
FENDANT HANKS IN THAT THE TWO 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT SEND CHECKS TO 
HANKS B U T IN FACT DID DELIVER 
THEIR CHECKS TO HANKS PERSONALLY, 
• WHO ACCEPTED THEM AT THE TIME AS 
PAYMENT IN FULL, WHICH CONCLU-
SIVELY DEMONSTRATES THE EXIST-
ENCE OF AN ORAL AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE PARTIES FOR STOCK. 
The record is unequivocably clear that Hanks 
accepted Briggs' and Apgood's check in payment in 
full for their respective shares of stock. Plaintiffs Briggs 
and Apgood were working for Hanks on another un-
derwriting deal in Salt Lake City, Utah, and were 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in close contact with Hanks. On March 6, 1962, Hanks 
accepted their checks in his Salt Lake City business 
office. On that same date the Sheriff of Salt Lake 
County served the summons and complaint in this 
action upon defendant Hanks by serving his wife at 
his abode. The following excerpts from the deposition 
of Finley L. Briggs clearly demonstrate the foregoing: 
29: 
Deposition of Finley D. Briggs, record 387, line 
"Many times I says, 'When are we going to 
get our stock?' And Lincoln (Hanks), one day, 
says, 'I'm so damn tired of all the hocus-pocus.' 
He says, 'You can have it any time, but I have 
to wait 13 months before we can transfer it to 
you.' 
Q. (By Mr. Hyde) When was this? 
A. While we were working here in Salt Lake 
on the dry cleaning deal. He said it not once, 
but several times. And we were always hag-
gling over the stock. 
Q. Did you give him a check for some stock, 
Mr. Briggs? 
A. Yes, sir." 
Q. (My Mr. Hyde) Did you tender it to Mr. 
Hanks on March 6, 1962? (R. 388, line 15). 
A. Yes, sir. 
Record 30, line 17: 
Q. (By Mr. Hyde) "Now do you remember 
the occasion when you tendered this check, 
dated March 6, 1962, to Mr. Hanks? 
11 
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A. Yes, I remember giving it to him. 
Q. All right. Tell me where and when that was. 
A. It was in his office on Broadway. 
Q. Was it on March 6th? 
A. Yes, sir, when I dated the check. 
Q. I see. And tell me what occurred there. 
A. We'd had a big hassle, the three of us. Mr. 
Buck Harris came in, and was taking our 
side, and he sent him out, because he didn't 
want Buck to get in on the conversation. So 
he sent him out of the room. "\Ve have dis-
cussed it many times since. 
Q. Now, what occurred? 
A. We had a big hassle. And Lincoln says, 'Yes, 
you're going to get your stock.' 
Q. Who said what? Tell me what he said. 
A. Lincoln said we could have our stock. 
Why should he take the check? I think nor-
mally if you're going to give a check for 
something, you expect value received. 
Q. Were you ... 
MR. HUGHES: Now just a moment. Now, 
you just try to answer his questions. 
THE WITNESS: All right . 
. 
MR .HUGHES: Just what you said. 
THE WITNESS: I don't remember what .. 
MR. HUGHES: 'Vhat Hanks said. 
THE WITNESS: I don't remember, ex-
actly. 
12 
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MR. HUGHES: The best you can. 
A. We went round and around over the whole 
-hassled about it. And finally Lincoln took 
the check, and said that 'Hap' (Apgood) and 
I could have our stock." 
Record 394, line 6: 
Q. (By Mr. Hyde) "You didn't threaten to 
sue ~Ir. Hanks, did you, at that time? 
A. Not a bit. There was not anything said to 
Hanks at that time. 
Q. You hadn't even considered that at that time? 
A. There had-it was even in the stew then. 
Q. What do you mean 'it was even in the stew'? 
A. We had talked to this boy here, and it was in 
progress, and I think the day after that, 
why, I think the day after that they served 
summons on Lincoln. 
Q. You didn't tell him what you were doing, 
did you? 
A. Why should I tell him what we were doing? 
He don't tell me what he's doing. 
Q. So you were all ready to serve him the next 
day, were you? 
A. I don't know. You'd have to ask my attorney. 
Q. Well, you just told me, Mr. Briggs. 
A. I said I think that the papers were served. 
So we must have been in the process of doing 
it, as I remember. 
Q. I see. And you didn't tell him that, did you? 
13 
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A. No. Because we went ahead and tried to stop 
the server from serving the papers on him. 
Because all we wanted was what was cOining. 
We had nothing against Lincoln, other than 
what we felt was our due and just reward. 
That's all we wanted. And this wouldn't a 
come up ... " 
Record 295, Line 12: 
Q. (By Mr. Hyde) You say you tried to stop 
the process server? 
A. I called the attorney. 
Q. What did you say to him? 
A. V\Tell, I told him that Lincoln-looked like 
we were going to get our stock,and that's 
all we wanted. 
And I think that Mr. Hughes tried to get 
ahold and stop the server, as I remember. 
Q. Well, did you feel that that's all you were 
entitled to? 
A. Is my stock? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. I thought I was going to get my stock, 
plus what, my commission on the boys." 
Plaintiff Apgood's deposition is similar: 
Page 25, Line 30: 
Q. (By ~Ir. Hyde) Do you remember that you 
and Briggs talked with Hanks and said if 
you didn't have to wait for three years, if you 
could have the stock now you could work 
better. 
14 
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A. There was nothing mentioned in there about 
three years. We knew we had the stock from 
Life of the West. There was nothing men-
tioned about waiting three years. The only 
waiting period was, that he brought up, that 
he had to keep the stock in his own name for 
13 months. After that time he was going to 
give it to the fellows. So he kept the stock in 
his name for 13 months or longer. 
Q. Did you ever pay for the stock? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you pay for it? 
A. I wrote him a check on-this year. I think it 
was in May. 
Q. That was the day you served him with papers? 
A. No, it was two days after. 
Q. You served him two days after you-
A. I think the papers were served a day or two 
after. 'V ait a minute here. No. Let's go back 
here a little ways. We gave him a check-I 
gave him a check for the stock, and I tried to 
stop the process server after he said that, 'You 
give us a check for the stock and I will re-
lease it to you.' 
Q. Did you tell him you were serving him with 
papers? 
A. No. 
Q. Why didn't you 1 
A. Why should I 1 
Q. So when you went up to talk to him you did 
15 
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not disclose that you had already prepared 
a suit against him 1 
A. Huh-uh. 
Q. 'Vhy didn't you 1 
A. Well ... 
Q. What was your motive In not telling him 
that? 
A. Why should I tell him I am going to serve 
papers on him 1 We have been after this 
stock now for a long time, and it's always 
been, 'Well, tomorrow, tomorrow, tomorrow, 
tomorrow.' All I wanted was my stock. So 
he accepted a check for the stock. 
Q. You mean you tendered a check for the 
stock? 
A. He accepted my check for the stock. 
Q. Did you have the money in the bank to cover 
the check? 
A. Yes." 
Page 49, line 12: 
Q. (By Mr. Hughes) "Did Mr. Hanks ever say 
to you, or did his crew chief, Mr. Joe 0 liver, 
ever say to you that you, as an individual 
salesman, could not receive your Life Assur-
ance Company of the 'Vest stock that he had 
agreed to sell to you, or that he would sell 
to you, unless you stayed for three years and 
worked with him? 
A. No. 
Q. "\V ~~ that condition ever preced.ent at any 
16 
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time stated to you by Mr. Hanks as a reason 
for not giving you the stock? 
A. No. 
Q. Is it a fact that the only reason he ever gave 
for not delivering the stock was he had to hold 
it for 13 months? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And further to show his good faith he would 
cause a letter to be delivered to you stating 
that? 
A. Right. Exactly. 
Q. Mr. Hyde has asked extensively about this 
check meeting and the Swiss Valet and the 
day that you left this check we have dis-
cussed with Mr. Hanks. Is it a fair statement 
to say that the only thing you and Mr. 
Briggs asked for at that time was that he 
make good his previous promise of the stock 
before you commenced, or continued to sell 
Swiss Valet? 
A. That is right. 
Q. At that time did Mr. Hanks say to you, you 
weren't entitled to the stock? 
A. He must have. 
Q. No-just did he? 
A. Excuse me. Go ahead. 
Q. Did he acknowledge you were both entitled 
to the stock on that occasion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did he take the check with the promise that 
17 
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he would have the stock delivered to you in 
your name? 
A. Right, yes, sir." 
Appellants are entitled to have the above testimony 
construed most favorably to their cause. When Hanks 
accepted Briggs' and Apgood's checks on March 6, 
1962, for full payment of their stock, in his office, he 
did not know of plaintiffs' suit. Upon arriving at his 
abode later in the day, he learned that his wife had been 
served a summons and complaint in this matter. (R. 
____ ). Hanks' refusal to deposit the checks after learn-
ing of this action does not alter the fact of his acknow 1-
edgment of the oral contract and his completion of 
same to these two plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
The Grace case does not control this action, for the 
Colorado Supreme Court simply hasn't followed it in 
three recent cases, namely: W oodhaus v. AckermanJ 
Rupp v. Hill and Coulter v. Anderson. 
Colorado requires that the part performance re-
lied upon be referable to the alleged oral contract and 
that if the oral contract were not enforced, one of the 
parties would be defrauded. 
Plaintiffs' acts of part performance, and particu-
larly Briggs' and Apgood's delivery of their checks to 
Hanks, and hi~ acceptance, of them are conclusively 
18 
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referable to the oral contract, thus removing the entire 
contract from within the statute of frauds. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT W. HUGHES 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
19 
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